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Abstract
Distributed machine learning generally aims at
training a global model based on distributed data
without collecting all the data to a centralized
location, where two different approaches have
been proposed: collecting and aggregating lo-
cal models (federated learning) and collecting
and training over representative data summaries
(coreset). While each approach preserves data
privacy to some extent thanks to not sharing the
raw data, the exact extent of protection is unclear
under sophisticated attacks that try to infer the
raw data from the shared information. We present
the first comparison between the two approaches
in terms of target model accuracy, communication
cost, and data privacy, where the last is measured
by the accuracy of a state-of-the-art attack strat-
egy called the membership inference attack. Our
experiments quantify the accuracy-privacy-cost
tradeoff of each approach, and reveal a nontrivial
comparison that can be used to guide the design
of model training processes.
1. Introduction
Machine learning (ML) has been the force of innovation
behind many sensor-driven intelligent systems such as au-
tonomous vehicles, personalized healthcare, precision agri-
culture, machine health monitoring, environmental tracking,
and infrastructure security. In many applications, because of
the limited observability at a single sensor (e.g., due to lim-
ited sensing range or angle), machine learning needs to be
performed on the data from multiple data sources. However,
due to limitations on network bandwidth, power consump-
tion, and data privacy, data sources often cannot upload
their raw data. Instead, they share the information in their
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local data using various distributed learning approaches,
where two of the most well-known approaches are: (i) shar-
ing models trained on the local data (e.g., federated learn-
ing (Konecˇny` et al., 2016)), or (ii) sharing representative
summaries of the local data (e.g., coreset (Feldman et al.,
2011)).
While each of these approaches has been studied separately,
to our knowledge, a comprehensive comparison between
them is still missing. In this work, we take a first step
towards filling this gap by comparing the federated learning
approach and the coreset-based approach in terms of (1)
the accuracy of the target machine learning model we want
to train, (2) the communication cost during training, and
(3) the leakage of the private training data. In particular,
although neither approach will require the data sources to
directly share their data, it has been shown in (Shokri et al.,
2017) that models derived from a dataset can be used to
infer the membership of the dataset (i.e., whether or not a
given data record is contained in the dataset), known as the
membership inference attack (MIA). Since the coreset can
also be viewed as a model, we can thus use the accuracy of
MIA as a practical measure of the privacy leakage.
1.1. Related Work
Federated learning (Konecˇny` et al., 2016) and coreset (Feld-
man et al., 2011) can both be used to train ML models over
distributed data without collecting the raw data to a central
location. Each approach has been independently studied,
such as adaptive federated learning (Wang et al., 2019),
communication-efficient coreset construction (Balcan et al.,
2013), and the robustness of coreset in supporting multiple
ML models (Lu et al., 2020). However, a comprehensive
comparison between them is still missing. In this work, we
perform an initial comparison with focus on data privacy.
ML models, which are derived from the training data, in-
evitably contain information of the records in the training
dataset. By utilizing this characteristic, various attacks have
been proposed to infer private information of the training
data from the existing ML models including neural networks.
These attacks can be generally classified into two categories:
model inversion attacks and membership inference attacks.
Model inversion attacks try to recover the training data by
observing the model predictions of the target model. The
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first model inversion attack was proposed by Fredrikson
et al. (Fredrikson et al., 2015) that exploits a given face
label to reconstruct the face of an individual belonging to
the training data of a face recognition system, which has
been generalized to attack the deep neural network models
(Zhang et al., 2019), generative models (Hayes et al., 2019),
and federated learning (Geiping et al., 2020). However,
the model inversion attacks are usually limited to certain
applications which may not be applicable to tasks other than
face recognition (Rahman et al., 2018).
In membership inference attack (MIA) (Shokri et al., 2017;
Salem et al., 2018; Nasr et al., 2019; Sablayrolles et al.,
2019), the adversary tries to infer whether a given input
data record belongs to the original training data of the target
model or not. This attack, proposed in (Shokri et al., 2017),
can be applied to any type of ML models and even under
the black-box setting, where only the model output (but not
the internal model parameters) is known to the adversary.
Salem et al. (Salem et al., 2018) relaxed the assumptions for
shadow models to broaden the applicability of MIA in prac-
tice. Sablayrolles et al. (Sablayrolles et al., 2019) proposed
the Bayes optimal strategies for MIA, by assuming certain
distributions of model parameters. Nasr et al. (Nasr et al.,
2019) has further extended MIA to federated learning in or-
der to quantify the privacy leakage in the distributed setting.
1.2. Summary of Contribution
We aim to compare the approach of federated learning with
the approach of sharing coresets, with focus on the privacy
risks imposed by MIA. Specifically:
• We are the first to systematically compare the ap-
proaches of federated learning and coreset-based learn-
ing in accuracy, privacy, and communication cost.
• We propose the first MIA against distributed coreset.
• Through experiments on real datasets, we not only
quantify the accuracy-privacy-cost tradeoff of each ap-
proach, but also reveal that which approach achieves a
better tradeoff can be different under different accuracy
requirements.
Roadmap. Section 2 reviews the high-level idea of MIA.
Section 3 defines it in detail for federated learning and core-
set. Sections 4 and 5 present our experiment design and re-
sults. Then Section 6 concludes the paper with discussions.
2. Overview of Membership Inference Attack
We start by reviewing the basic idea of MIA as proposed
in (Shokri et al., 2017), based on the following models:
– Target model: Target model is the machine learning model
trained on private data and then revealed to the public (in-
cluding the adversary). Given a data record d, let ftarget(d)
denote the output of the target model, where ftarget(·) is
referred to as the prediction function. For example, if the
target model is a neural net trained to predict the label in a
set of all possible labels Dtarget, then ftarget(d) will be a
|Dtarget|-dimensional vector denoting the predicted prob-
abilities for d to have each of the labels in Dtarget. Let
Dtraintarget and D
test
target denote the training/testing dataset of
the target model.
– Shadow model: Shadow model is a machine learning model
of the same type as the target model, constructed by the
adversary to mirror the target model. Let Dtrainshadow and
Dtestshadow denote the training/testing data of the shadow
model, and fshadow(·) denote the prediction function.
– Attack model: Attack model is a binary classifier designed
by the adversary to infer the membership of data records
of interest with respect to the training dataset of the target
model, which will have different structures according to
different target models.
Workflow: The key intuition of MIA is to exploit the dif-
ference in how the target model responds to data records
that are in its training data versus data records that are not.
At a high level, MIA works in three steps: (1) First, the
adversary constructs shadow models to mirror the behavior
of the target model. (2) Then, the shadow models are used to
generate training data for the attack model. Specifically, the
prediction vector on each training data record of the shadow
model, i.e., fshadow(d) for d ∈ Dtrainshadow, is labeled as
“IN” (in the training data), and the prediction vector on each
testing data record, i.e., fshadow(d) for d ∈Dtestshadow, is la-
beled as “OUT” (not in the training data). (3) Finally, these
prediction vectors together with their associated “IN/OUT”
labels are used to train the attack model, which can then be
used to infer whether a given data record is in the training
data of the target model.
Enhancement: The accuracy of MIA depends on how well
the shadow model approximates the target model and how
well Dtrainshadow approximates D
train
target. While several meth-
ods of generating Dtrainshadow have been proposed in (Shokri
et al., 2017), how well each method approximates Dtraintarget
can vary substantially from case to case. To obtain a con-
servative estimation of the privacy leakage, we assume a
stronger adversary who has access to part of the target
model’s training/testing data. This assumption is the same
as the supervised white box setting in (Nasr et al., 2019).
Specifically, let Straintarget ⊂Dtraintarget and Stesttarget ⊂Dtesttarget
denote the subsets of the training/testing data leaked to
the adversary. Then the adversary will know that each
ftarget(d) for d ∈ Straintarget has the label “IN” (in the train-
ing data), and each ftarget(d) for d ∈ Stesttarget has the label
“OUT” (not in the training data), which provides the follow-
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ing training dataset for the attack model:
Dtrainattack = {(ftarget(d), IN)}d∈Straintarget
∪ {ftarget(d),OUT)}d∈Stesttarget . (1)
Therefore, under this assumption, this stronger adversary no
longer needs to construct shadow models, which are directly
replaced by the target model. The focus is thus on designing
the attack model. To attack federated learning, we will apply
the design in (Nasr et al., 2019). To attack coreset-based
learning, we will design our own attack model as explained
later in Section 3.2.2.
3. Membership Inference Attack under
Federated or Coreset-based Learning
In this section, we will provide details about the design of
MIA under federated learning and coreset-based learning,
respectively. For both approaches, we consider a setting
with a server interested in learning the target model over
data distributed across N nodes. We assume that the ad-
versary can eavesdrop all the communications between the
server and the nodes. In the sequel, we will use neural net-
work as the target model, which is known to be particularly
vulnerable to MIA (Nasr et al., 2019).
3.1. Attack on Federated Learning
3.1.1. FEDERATED LEARNING
Assuming that stochastic gradient descent is used to train the
target model, we consider a version of federated learning
with one global aggregation per training epoch, i.e., all
the nodes will report their local models to a central server
after each step of local gradient descent, and the server will
aggregate the models by taking a weighted average and send
the resulting model to the nodes. This version of federated
learning is known to give a target model that is equivalent
to the model trained by gradient descent on the union of all
the local training data (Wang et al., 2019).
3.1.2. ATTACK MODEL
In contrast to the black-box attack in the centralized set-
ting (Shokri et al., 2017), MIA under federated learning is a
white-box attack, since all the information exchanged during
the training process is also received by the adversary. That
is, the adversary observes not only the outputs of the target
model, but also the internal parameters of the target model
and all the intermediate results during training. To design
the attack in the white-box setting, we apply the methods
from (Nasr et al., 2019). Let f(d,W ) and L(f(d,W ), y)
denote the prediction function and the loss function associ-
ated with the target model, where d is an input data record,
y is the corresponding label, and W is the vector of model
parameters. Then the attack model will have 5 components
of input from each training epoch (n: number of layers of
the target model):
• The gradients of the loss function {∂L/∂W i}ni=1 from
all the layers of the target model (W i: parameters at
layer i);
• The activation vectors {hi(d)}n−1i=1 from all hidden
layers (hi(d): output of layer i for input record d);
• The output f(d,W ) of the target model;
• The one-hot encoding (y) of label y1;
• The loss of the target model L(f(d,W ), y);
The attack model is a hierarchy of neural networks as
illustrated in Figure 1. First, each component is fed into
a fully connected neural network (FCN), except for the
gradient component which is fed into a convolutional
neural network (CNN). Then, the outputs of all the 5 neural
networks are concatenated and passed to an FCN with
IN/OUT probabilities as the final output. See (Nasr et al.,
2019) for more details.
Figure 1. Attack model against federated learning
3.2. Attack on Coreset-based Learning
3.2.1. CORESET CONSTRUCTION
To construct a coreset over distributed data, we apply the
distributed robust coreset construction (DRCC) algorithm
from (Lu et al., 2020), which is proved to support multiple
machine learning models with guaranteed performance. The
DRCC algorithm works in three steps:
1. Each node calculates its own k-means centers for sev-
eral k values and returns the k-means costs to the cen-
tral server;
2. Based on the local k-means costs, the central server
computes the number of local k-means centers and the
number of local samples for each node according to a
desired total coreset size, and communicates these to
the nodes;
1One-hot encoding y of a label i ∈ {1, . . . , N} is a length-N
binary vector with the i-th entry being ‘1’ and all the rest being ‘0’
(Wikipedia, 2020).
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(a) concatenation (b) hierarchical
Figure 2. Two architectures of attack model for coreset (N = 2)
3. After receiving the parameters from the server, each
node will calculate and report its local coreset, which
consists of two parts: (1) the local k-means centers,
(2) the local samples randomly drawn from the local
dataset with probabilities proportional to the squared
Euclidean distance from each data record to the nearest
local k-means center.
3.2.2. ATTACK MODEL
From the coreset construction algorithm, clearly the main
information exposed to the adversary is the coreset itself,
which is a union of the local coresets. Since the local sam-
ples are from the training data and thus expose part of the
training dataset, we will include them in Straintarget
2. The focus
is on designing an attack model based on the local k-means
centers to infer the membership of the unexposed training
data. To our knowledge, how to design the attack model for
MIA on k-means has not been studied before.
According to the design principle of MIA (Section 2), the
first step is to define a proper prediction function ftarget(·)
for k-means. Although the natural output of k-means for an
input data record d should be the index of the nearest center
(i.e., the cluster index of d), this information is too little for
membership inference. We thus propose to define ftarget to
include the distances from the input data record to all the
k-means centers: ftarget(d) = (‖d− c1‖, . . . , ‖d− ckˆ‖),
where ‖ · ‖ denotes the Euclidean distance, and {ci}kˆi=1 is
the set of local centers reported from all the nodes.
We then use such distance vectors together with their
IN/OUT labels generated as in Equation (1) to train a neural
network as the attack model. As the features (i.e., distances
to local centers) are naturally partitioned into N sets corre-
sponding to the N nodes, we propose two architectures for
the attack model: (1) concatenation (Figure 2 (a)), which is
to concatenate all the features and pass them into an FCN;
(2) hierarchical (Figure 2 (b)), which is to pass features
from different nodes into different neurons of the second
layer, whose outputs are then concatenated and passed into
higher layers which form an FCN. The intuition behind the
hierarchical design is that by feeding features from each
node to only (1/N )-th of the neurons in the second layer,
we can reduce the number of parameters to learn and thus
potentially train the attack model better on limited data.
2We also consider constructing coreset with k-means centers
only, whose results are given in Appendix A.
4. Experiment Design
4.1. Datasets
We used two datasets in our experiments, both of which
have been used for MIA (Shokri et al., 2017): Locations
dataset, and Purchase100 dataset.
Locations: Locations dataset was created by collect-
ing Foursquare social network’s location “check-ins” in
Bangkok from April 2012 to September 2013. It contains
5010 records with 446 binary features each, representing
whether a user visited certain places. The dataset has been
clustered into 30 clusters, and the cluster indices repre-
sent 30 different geosocial types. The target model for this
dataset aims at predicting the geosocial type of a new user.
Purchase100: Purchase100 dataset was simplified from the
Kaggles “acquire valued shoppers” challenge dataset. It
contains 197,324 users’ purchase history in one year, with
600 binary features each denoting whether or not a user pur-
chased a certain product. The dataset has been clustered into
100 clusters, where the cluster indices represent different
purchasing styles. The target model for this dataset aims at
predicting the purchasing style of a new user.
4.2. Experiment Setup
All the experiments are based on a distributed setting, in
which there are two nodes each holding half of the training
data. For Locations dataset, we randomly select 3,000 data
records as the target model’s training data and leave the
rest as testing data. For Purchase100 dataset, we randomly
select 30,000 data records as the target model’s training
data, and another 20,000 data records as the target model’s
testing data. As explained in Section 2, we assume that
part of the target model’s training/testing data has been
exposed to the adversary for a conservative evaluation of the
privacy leakage. Specifically, let Straintarget ⊂ Dtraintarget and
Stesttarget ⊂Dtesttarget denote the subsets of the target model’s
training and testing data that are exposed to the adversary.
The goal of MIA is to use this information together with
the information exposed during the target model training
process (e.g., gradients, coreset) to infer the membership of
data records in the unexposed part of the training data (i.e.,
Dtraintarget \ Straintarget). In our experiments, we use S′traintarget ⊂
Dtraintarget as “IN” samples and S
′test
target ⊂Dtesttarget as “OUT”
samples to test the accuracy of the attack model, satisfying
Straintarget ∩ S′traintarget = ∅, Stesttarget ∩ S′testtarget = ∅. (2)
For Locations, we set |Straintarget| = 1, 750, |Stesttarget| = 1750,
|S′traintarget| = 250, and |S′testtarget| = 250. For Purchase100,
we set |Straintarget| = 6, 000, |Stesttarget| = 6, 000, |S′traintarget| =
2, 000, and |S′testtarget| = 2, 000.
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(a) vs. #epochs (b) vs. coreset size
Figure 3. Testing accuracy of the target model vs. #epochs and
coreset size (Locations dataset)
Evaluation metrics: In order to compare the different ap-
proaches of training the target model (federated learning vs.
coreset), we propose the following evaluation metrics:
• the accuracy of the target model (‘accuracy’), measured
by the target model’s testing accuracy,
• the privacy leakage (‘leakage’), measured by the attack
model’s testing accuracy, and
• the communication cost (‘cost’), measured by number
of scalars transmitted by all the nodes during training.
As both approaches have design parameters to control the
tradeoff between these metrics (#training epochs for the
federated learning approach and coreset size for the coreset-
based approach), we will first tune the design parameters
to align the quality of the target models trained by each
approach and then compare the other metrics.
5. Experiment Results
5.1. Results on Locations Dataset
We design the target model as a 4-layer FCN with 256 and
128 neurons in the first and the second hidden layers, and
30 neurons in the last layer, whose output represents the
predicted probabilities for the input data record to belong
to each of the 30 geosocial types. When trained on the raw
training data, this model yields a testing accuracy of 70%.
5.1.1. PARAMETER SETTING
As shown in Figure 3, both approaches of training the target
model on distributed training data exhibit a concave and
increasing accuracy as a function of the design parameters.
However, the coreset-based approach requires a coreset size
almost equal to the size of the entire training dataset to
obtain a target model as accurate as the model trained on the
raw training data. Therefore, if we want to fully preserve
the accuracy of the target model while having some level
of protection on the training data, only federated learning
is applicable. Meanwhile, if we can tolerate a little loss of
accuracy, then both approaches become applicable.
Table 1. Results on Locations Dataset
approach accuracy leakage cost
federated learning
(33 epochs)
65.9% 57.4% 19,958,136
coreset (size 1,500) 65.0% 55%3 700,500
federated learning
(100 epochs)
70% 73.8% 60,479,200
coreset (size 3,000) 70% 100% 1,401,000
Federated Learning: To test the full accuracy scenario, we
run federated learning until convergence, which takes 100
epochs. To test the partial accuracy scenario, we manually
terminate the training process at epoch 33, which yields
a target model with testing accuracy 65.9% as shown in
Figure 3 (a). Our attack model is constructed based on the
approach discussed in Section 3.1.2, which takes 5 com-
ponents as inputs: gradients, hidden layer outputs, final
outputs, loss and one-hot encoding of labels. Due to the
large number of such inputs over all the training epochs,
we only use inputs from 5 epochs evenly distributed in the
training process to train the attack model. Moreover, for
the first two components, we only utilize the last layer’s
gradients and the last hidden layer’s outputs. The way we
apply MIA and the parameters we use are consistent with
those proposed in Appendix A of (Nasr et al., 2019).
Coreset-based Learning: As shown in Figure 3 (b), the
coreset degenerates into the entire training dataset to achieve
full accuracy. The focus is thus on the partial accuracy
scenario, where we set the coreset size to 1,500, containing
100 random samples (considered part of the exposed training
data Straintarget) and 700 local centers from each node. This
coreset yields a target model with testing accuracy matching
that trained by federated learning after 33 epochs. The
result for another coreset containing no random sample can
be found in the appendix.
5.1.2. RESULTS
The results are shown in Table 1. We see that: (i) in the
full accuracy scenario (70% accuracy), sharing coreset de-
generates into sharing the raw training data, and hence the
federated learning approach is more desirable in terms of pri-
vacy protection; (ii) in the partial accuracy scenario (≈ 65%
accuracy), sharing coreset no longer causes more privacy
leakage than federated learning, while having the advantage
of incurring a much lower communication cost.
5.2. Results on Purchase100 Dataset
We design the target model as a 6-layer FCN with 1024,
512, 256, and 128 neurons in the hidden layers, and 100
3This is achieved under the concatenation architecture. Under
the hierarchical architecture, the attack accuracy is 51.6%.
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Figure 4. Testing accuracy of the target model vs. #epochs and
coreset size (Purchase100 dataset)
neurons in the last layer, whose output denotes the predicted
probabilities for the input data record to belong to each of
the 100 purchasing styles. When trained on the raw training
data using stochastic gradient descent, this target model
yields a testing accuracy of 83.4%.
5.2.1. PARAMETER SETTING
Figure 4 shows the testing accuracy of the target model
trained by each approach as a function of its design param-
eter. We observe a similar trend as in Figure 3, where the
coreset-based approach again requires a coreset as large as
the entire training dataset to achieve the full accuracy.
Federated Learning: To test the full accuracy scenario, we
run federated learning for 100 epochs, which guarantees
convergence. To test the partial accuracy scenario, we termi-
nate the training process at epoch 30, which gives a target
model with 79.8% testing accuracy as shown in Figure 4 (a).
The attack model is designed in the same way as that for the
Locations dataset. In particular, following the approach in
(Nasr et al., 2019), we train the attack model on the inputs
from 5 epochs evenly distributed in the training process,
and from each of these epochs, we only use the last layer’s
gradients and the last hidden layer’s outputs, in addition to
the final outputs, loss, and one-hot encoding of labels, to
train the attack model.
Coreset-based Learning: As the coreset offers no privacy
protection in the full accuracy scenario, we focus on the
partial accuracy scenario. According to Figure 4 (b), we set
the coreset size to 15,000, including 5,000 random samples
(considered part of Straintarget) and 5,000 local centers from
each node. The target model trained on this coreset has
a similar testing accuracy as the target model trained by
federated learning after 30 epochs. See the appendix for
results on another coreset with no random sample.
5.2.2. RESULTS
The results, shown in Table 2, indicate similar comparisons
as in Section 5.1.2, i.e., (i) in the full accuracy scenario
(83.4%), the federated learning approach is more desirable
as it still provides some privacy protection (although at a
Table 2. Results on Purchase100 Dataset
approach accuracy leakage cost
federated learning
(30 epochs)
79.8% 59.8% 158,081,760
coreset (size 15,000) 78.4% 51%4 9,015,000
federated learning
(100 epochs)
83.4% 72.0% 526,939,200
coreset (size 30,000) 83.4% 100% 18,030,000
much higher communication cost); (ii) if we can tolerate
mild loss of accuracy (≈ 79%), then sharing coreset be-
comes more desirable as it achieves the same accuracy as
federated learning with less privacy leakage and a much
lower communication cost.
6. Concluding Discussions
In this work, we present the first systematic comparison
between federated learning and coreset-based learning in
terms of the target model accuracy, the privacy leakage un-
der MIA, and the communication cost. By experimenting
with state-of-the-art attack models and real datasets, we re-
veal a nontrivial comparison between the two approaches,
where federated learning is better at protecting the privacy
of the training data when we need a target model of the max-
imum accuracy, whereas coreset-based learning can provide
comparable privacy at a much lower communication cost
when we can tolerate a mild loss of target model accuracy.
Our observation is consistent with the existing result in (Nasr
et al., 2019), that the gradients during the training process
can expose the membership of the training data, as federated
learning exposes this information but coreset does not.
We have only compared the original versions of federated
learning and coreset-based learning that do not consider
privacy. Recently, several defenses have been proposed to
mitigate MIA on machine learning models, which either
insert noise to the target model training process by using
differential privacy or adversarial learning (Jia et al., 2019),
or regulate the training process to reduce overfitting (Nasr
et al., 2018). There have also been defenses proposed to
enhance the privacy protection for coresets (Feldman et al.,
2017). Therefore, investigating how the privacy-aware ver-
sions of these approaches compare in terms of accuracy,
privacy, and cost can be an interesting future direction.
Methods for optimizing federated learning (Konecˇny` et al.,
2016; Wang et al., 2019; Han et al., 2020) can also be incor-
porated into this study in the future, which can significantly
reduce the communication cost of federated learning.
4This is achieved under the hierarchical architecture. Under
the concatenation architecture, the attack accuracy is 50%.
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Sharing Models or Coresets: A Study based on Membership Inference Attack
A. Appendix: Additional Evaluations
In addition to the typical construction of distributed coreset,
we have also evaluated the setting when distributed coreset
consists of k-means centers only. By constructing coreset
in this way, there will be no data record from the origi-
nal training dataset exposed directly through the coreset.
Specifically, the results are given below.
A.1. Locations dataset
All parameters used in this section for Locations dataset
are the same as in Section 5.1.1 except the structure of
distributed coreset. The coreset has 1, 500 k-means centers
only (750 per node), instead of both k-means centers and
random samples. The results comparing federated learning
and this distributed coreset are given in Table 3, which show
a qualitatively similar comparison as in Section 5.1.2.
A.2. Purchase100 dataset
Similarly, we collect 7, 500 k-means centers from each node
to form a distributed coreset, based on which the target
model’s testing accuracy is now 75.0%. In order to align
with this testing accuracy, we manually pause federated
learning at epoch 20 and obtain 75.1% testing accuracy.
The remaining parameters and designs are the same as in
Section 5.2.1. The results, shown in Table 4, are qualita-
tively similar to those in Section 5.2.2.
A.3. Discussions
According to the results as shown in tables above, although
the gap in MIA accuracy between the two approaches is
smaller, we can still draw similar conclusions as before,
while not directly revealing any training data through the
coreset. That is, if we can tolerate a moderate degradation
of the target model’s performance, then we can construct
distributed coreset with k-means centers only, which will
provide better privacy and less communication cost than
federated learning.
Table 3. Results on Locations Dataset with k-means centers only
approach accuracy leakage cost
federated learning
(33 epochs)
65.9% 57.4% 19,958,136
coreset
(size 1, 500,
with k-means
centers only)
64.48% 54.4%5 700,500
Table 4. Results on Purchase100 Dataset with k-means centers
only
approach accuracy leakage cost
federated learning
(20 epochs)
75.1% 55.4% 105,387,840
coreset
(size 15, 000,
with k-means
centers only)
75.0% 51.9%6 9,015,000
5This is achieved under the concatenation architecture. Under
the hierarchical architecture, the attack accuracy is 52.8%.
6This is achieved under the hierarchical architecture. Under
the concatenation architecture, the attack accuracy is 51.4%.
